Reducing information asymmetry with ICT: A critical review of loan price and quantity effects in Africa by Asongu , Simplice et al.
1 
International Journal of Managerial Finance
Reducing Information Asymmetry with ICT: A critical review of loan price and 
quantity effects in Africa 
Abstract 
Purpose- This study investigates loan price and quantity effects of information sharing 
offices with ICT, in a panel of 162 banks consisting of 42 African countries for the period 
2001-2011. 
Design/methodology/approach- The empirical evidence is based on a panel of 162 banks in 
42 African countries for the period 2001-2011. Misspecification errors associated with 
endogenous variables and unobserved heterogeneity in financial access are addressed with 
Generalised Method of Moments and Instrumental Quantile Regressions. 
Findings- Our findings uncover several major themes. First, ICT when integrated with the 
role of public credit registries significantly lowered the price of loans and raised the quantity 
of loans. Second, while the net effects from the interaction of ICT with private credit bureaus 
do not improve financial access, the corresponding marginal effects show that ICT could 
complement the characteristics of private credit bureaus to reduce loan prices and increase 
loan quantity, but only when certain thresholds of ICT are attained. We compute and discuss 
the policy implications of these ICT thresholds for banks with low, intermediate and high 
levels of financial access.  
Originality/value-This is one of the few studies to assess how the growing ICT can be 
leveraged in order to reduce information asymmetry in the banking industry with the ultimate 
aim of improving financial access in a continent where lack of access to finance is a critical 
policy syndrome.  
JEL Classification: G20; G29; L96; O40; O55 
Keywords: Financial access; Information asymmetry; ICT 
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1. Introduction
There have been very few papers that study information sharing for financial access.  Most 
specifically, we are interested in studying the gains that can be made from information sharing 
in terms of enhanced access to  financial services in the context of the African banking sector, 
where investments are increasingly needed in order for the continent to develop. When 
compared to the rest of the world, the African continent has more room for information and 
communication technology (henceforth ICT) penetration. Moreover, there are growing 
concerns that there is excess liquidity in African banking institutions, due primarily to the 
growing problems of information asymmetry in the sector. A substantial bulk of the current 
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literature on African business emphasises the need for more domestic private investment 
because, for the most part,  the structural adjustment programmes initiated over the past 
decades have failed to generate the much needed external finance (Tuomi, 2011; Rolfe & 
Woodward, 2004; Darley, 2012; Bartels et al., 2009).  
Additionally, as documented by Penard et al. (2012), there is  ample room for 
improving the penetration of ICT in Africa because ICT growth is  stagnating in the high-end 
economies of North America, Europe and Asia. For instance, as of 2010, whereas developed 
countries were experiencing saturation points in mobile phone and internet penetrations of 41 
percent, the corresponding  diffusion rate in Africa  was 9.6 percent.  Therefore, we may infer 
that there is considerable potential for  leveraging  ICT for economic development outcomes 
in the African continent.  
The concerns of surplus liquidity in African financial institutions (Saxegaard, 2006; 
Fouda, 2009; Asongu, 2014, p.70) are traceable to information asymmetry between lenders 
and borrowers. In this light, policies conducive to the establishment of information sharing 
offices have been founded on the need to address the surplus liquidity issues as well as a 
plethora of factors that are endogenous to increasing information asymmetry, namely: 
physical access, affordability and eligibility to lending from banks (Allen et al., 2011; Batuo 
& Kupukile, 2010).  
Studies on information sharing offices have for the most part been positioned on 
developed countries. Most specifically, a substantial number of existing papers focused on 
countries in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Latin 
America and Asia. This is ironic because these high-income nations have fewer financial 
access  problems compared with less developed countries (Asongu et al., 2016a). To put 
things in perspective, no African country was included in the study by Galindo and Miller 
(2001).  Love and Mylenko (2003) considered  only four African countries. This was then 
followed by Barth et al. (2009) who covered nine African countries.  
The study by Triki and Gajigo (2014), is closest to the positioning of our present 
inquiry. They used Probit models to evaluate the effects of public and private credit bureaus 
on access to finance by enterprises in 42 African countries for the 2006 to 2009 period. Our 
study is distinct from Triki and Gajigo (2014) in three main  ways.  First, we make use of a 
larger and more comprehensive dataset of countries for a longer time period 2001-2011. 
Second, in terms of methodology, we use a Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) in order 
to address concerns of endogeneity by controlling for time invariant omitted variables and 
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1 Throughout the study, the term financial access is used interchangeably with ‘loan quantity’ and/or ‘loan price’. 
Sections 2.2 and 2.3 link financial access to loan price and quantity while discussing how the role of information 
sharing offices are related to loan price and quantity. In these sections, we further substantiate the positioning of 
the current study by justifying how the banking industry collect and shares information with credit  registries 
through the use of technological platforms like mobile phone and internet in order to  improve or make 
adjustment to loan prices and quantity of loans. 
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heterogeneity in access to finance. Indeed, Triki and Gajigo (2014) acknowledged the failure 
to account for such endogenous variable errors as a caveat of their inquiry. Additionally, we 
investigate the linkages throughout the conditional distributions of access to finance using 
Instrumental Variable Quantile Regressions (IVQR). Such allows us to understand the role of 
information sharing credit registries in facilitating access to finance in banks with low, 
intermediate and high levels of  intermediation. The policy relevance of this Quantile 
Regression is that it highlights the deficiency of traditional one-size fits all policies designed 
to improve financial access across countries through the functions of information sharing 
offices. Such blanket arrangements may not be effective unless they are contingent on 
existing levels of financial access and tailored  to suit  the unique characteristics of institutions 
with different levels of financial intermediation.  
Third, we integrate ICT-related policy variables into the modelling exercise in order to 
examine how internet and mobile phone penetrations complement the role of information 
sharing offices in  lessening information asymmetry. Such should enhance financial access, in 
terms of increased quantity of loans and reduced price of loans
1
.
Overall, assessing the impact on loan price and quantity of policies to reduce 
information asymmetry with ICT is of particular interest to governments in emerging and 
developing economies. This is because the findings would inform policy makers on which 
technology platforms  could be employed to boost access to financial services. Such should 
enable poor households and small businesses to increase consumption, investment and 
productivity which would ultimately culminate in higher employment and economic well-
being. Another study closest to this paper is Asongu (2017) which directly investigated the 
relationship between information asymmetry and financial access, excluding ICT as a policy 
variable. In the current inquiry, we recognise the need to include those policy instruments 
which public and private registries could use to efficiently enhance the flow of information 
between banks and their customers.  Therefore, within this policy framework, we employ ICT 
in terms of mobile phone and internet penetration rates.  Theoretically speaking, these are the 
mechanisms by which the functioning of information sharing offices can be directly 
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 Moreover, a recent bulk of African financial development literature has failed to recognise the relevance of 
information sharing offices in financial access  (Fowowe, 2014; Daniel, 2017; Wale & Makina, 2017; 
Chikalipah, 2017; Osah & Kyobe, 2017; Bocher et al., 2017; Oben & Sakyi, 2017; Chapoto & Aboagye, 2017; 
Ofori-Sasu et al., 2017; Iyke & Odhiambo, 2017; Boadi et al., 2017). 
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supervised by governments. This concept is consistent with recent literature on the relevance 
on ICT as a policy tool in promoting positive macroeconomic outcomes (Asongu et al., 2017). 
Our results broadly show that the integration of ICT with the role of public credit 
registries for collecting and sharing information on credit transactions significantly decrease 
the price of loans and increase the quantity of loans extended by banks. By contrast, the net 
effects from the interaction of ICT with the functions of private credit bureaus do not lead to a 
marked improvement in access to financial intermediation. Such substantiates our decision to 
clearly account for the distinction in the main goals and regulatory structures of public credit 
registries (PCRs) and private credit bureaus (PCBs) in our empirical modelling. Nevertheless, 
the corresponding marginal effects show that ICT can complement the functions of private 
credit bureaus to lower loan prices and raise loan quantity, but only after certain thresholds of 
ICT penetration rates are attained. We compute and discuss the feasibility of these ICT 
thresholds which are required to boost the efficiency of these technology platforms.  
The findings contribute both to the scholarly and policy literature in two key ways. 
First, by employing the ICT moderating proxies, our study complements a recent strand 
of African development literature which has exclusively articulated the relevance of 
information sharing offices in reducing information asymmetry, leading to better access to 
finance. Examples of these papers include: Triki and Gajigo (2014) and Asongu (2017) which 
were discussed in the prior paragraphs;  Kusi et al. (2017)  and Kusi and OpokuMensah 
(2018)  confirmed that information sharing  reduces bank credit risk and the cost of funding; 
Muaza and Alagidede (2017) concluded that, the rewards of financial access from collecting 
and the sharing of information on loan transactions is less apparent in French civil law 
countries, compared with their English common law counterparts
2
.
Second, on the policy front, the study employs policy ICT variables that can be 
leveraged to modulate the effect of the availability and design of information sharing offices 
on households’ and firms’ access to finance. To this end, by providing thresholds at which 
ICT can effectively complement the activities of information sharing offices to boost financial 
access, the study provides specific critical cut-off points which policymakers should target 
where the management of ICT  diffusion rate is concerned. The confirmation of positive ICT 
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thresholds is consistent with a recent strand of economic development literature which 
characterizes the effectiveness of the  inclusion of moderating policy variables in empirical 
modelling in the following terms: “no positive thresholds, no policy” (Asongu et al., 2018a, 
p.1).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the stylized facts, 
background and theoretical underpinnings. Section 3 describes the data and methodology. 
Section 4 discusses the empirical results with related policy implications. Section 5 concludes 
and provides future research directions.  
2. Stylized facts, background and theoretical underpinnings
2.1 Stylized facts and background 
Less than 20 percent  of African households have access to formal financial services 
(IFAD, 2011). The stylized facts maintain that the main factors limiting formal financial 
access include: poor transport facilities, low population densities and limited communication 
infrastructure. According to the narrative, even in regions with comparatively higher rates of 
financial intermediation, some households and small corporations may still be faced with 
credit constraints allied with strict documentation and considerable collaterals. Moreover, in 
cases where the underlying lending conditions are fulfilled, financial access could still be 
limited by high costs (e.g. transaction fees) and substantial minimum saving requirements.  
Credit reference offices are institutions that are designed to collect and share 
information on the financial records of borrowers (both individual and commercial) from 
many sources. These may include public bodies such as courts, government departments, 
utilities, retailers, banks and credit card providers (Tchamyou & Asongu, 2017a). Once the 
data is collected, it is cross-checked for accuracy and then consolidated into a comprehensive 
report for use by lenders to better understand the creditworthiness of their borrowers. The 
published  data would normally encompass both positive and negative borrower credit 
histories. Examples of positive information include reports on the size of loans and repayment 
profiles of debtors while negative information is overwhelmingly dominated by default data 
and court judgements.  
According to Mylenko (2008), prior to the year 2008, information sharing offices were 
solidly established for the most part in Asia, Latin America, European and North American 
countries. However, the global financial crisis and growing ICT, prompted the creation of 
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credit reference agencies across Africa. Indeed, before 2008, with the exception of South 
Africa, not many African countries had well-functioning credit reference bureaus, either 
private or public. What is more, the majority of institutions for collecting and disseminating 
credit information were publicly owned with a stated goal of supervising the banking sector 
rather than satisfying a market demand for reliable borrower information. Consequently, the 
price of loans in Africa remained high when compared with the other emerging and 
developing regions for two main reasons. First,  the  inability of credit registries to provide 
timely and accurate information on borrowers’ credit history. Second,  the  limited use of new 
and innovative technologies by credit bureaus to disseminate credit information on borrowers 
and their lenders online. This latter point articulates the complementary role of ICT in 
facilitating the goal of information sharing agencies to reduce information asymmetry and 
consequently enhance access to  finance for all economic operators.  
2.2 Information sharing and financial access: theoretical and empirical evidence 
2.2.1.Theoretical underpinnings  
The objective of this section is twofold. First, it links financial access to loan price and 
quantity. Second, it discusses how information sharing offices are related to loan price and 
quantity.  From a logical standpoint, a reduction in loan price signifies greater access to credit, 
particularly for households and microenterprises which are generally financially underserved. 
These investors are now incentivised to borrow at the cheaper rate. Similarly, an increase in 
loan quantity reflects alleviation in the ability of banks to transform deposits into credit. Such 
should lead to an improvement in access to financial services for economic agents. Therefore, 
loan price and loan quantity have been used as proxies for financial access in recent literature 
on the effects of information sharing agencies on household and/or corporate access to finance 
(see for example, Asongu, 2017; Asongu et al., 2018b).   
Two principal views exist in the literature on the theoretical connection between credit 
reference agencies and access to finance (Claus & Grimes, 2003). The first perspective is 
oriented towards bank liquidity provisions, whereas the second considers the capacity of 
financial institutions to manage credit transactions and associated  risk characteristics. Both 
views however are founded on the premise that the main goal of financial institutions is to 
boost intermediation by reducing the cost of transforming mobilised deposits into credit. The 
theoretical foundations of the linkage between information sharing offices and improved 
financial intermediation are substantiated by the imperfect market information literature. The 
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principal role of information sharing registries in financial intermediation is to reduce the 
costs of information on credit transactions that are caused by information asymmetry between 
lenders and borrowers in the banking industry. By addressing this problem of asymmetric 
information, credit bureaus aim to lessen the financial constraints and raise competition, with 
concomitant improvement in the efficient allocation of capital. 
In the light of the above, the relationship between financial access and information 
sharing offices faces two major problems: (i) adverse selection from lenders and (ii) moral 
hazard from borrowers.  On the one hand, information sharing offices reduce adverse 
selection in banks by providing them with a comprehensive picture of the credit history of 
borrowers. Consolidated knowledge on information from borrowers reduces incremental 
interest rates that would have been levied by financial institutions in order to compensate for 
the risk of adverse selection. On the other, once loans have been granted to borrowers, they 
are liable of moral hazard — a behaviour that consists of concealing the nature and/or return 
on the activities to which the loan is granted with the ultimate aim of avoiding and/or limiting 
compliance with their repayment obligations. Consequently, a key role of credit bureaus is to 
inform  borrowers on the perils of defaulting on their debts including those obtained from the 
informal sector. The informal financial sector is normally considered as a viable alternative to 
the formal banking sector by credit registries when compiling credit histories for borrowers. 
Information sharing offices can thus reduce a borrower’s moral hazard by playing a role in the 
design and enforcement of policies aimed at encouraging market discipline. In summary: 
information sharing offices help (i) mitigate adverse selection ex-ante of lending and  (ii) 
reduce moral hazard, ex-post of lending.  
2.2.2 Empirical literature 
While there is a bulk of literature on the effects of information sharing offices on 
financial access (Pagano & Jappelli, 1993; Padilla & Pagano, 2000; Karapetyan & Stacescu, 
2014a, 2014b; Kusi et al., 2017; Kusi & OpokuMensah, 2018; Muaza & Alagidede, 2017; 
Boateng et al., 2018c; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2018), two main strands are worthy of further 
explanation. 
The first feature in the literature proposes that the free flow of information increases 
competition in the credit market, disciplines borrowers, reduces moral hazard and mitigates 
adverse selection. Accordingly, studies within this strand argue that the sharing of information 
between banks enables them to make quicker and more accurate decisions on the 
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creditworthiness of their borrowers (Jappelli & Pagano, 2002, 2006; Padilla & Pagano, 1997, 
2000; Bennardo et al., 2015).  Some conclusions in the literature include positions  that the 
sharing of information between banks: renders borrowers less likely to default on their debts 
(Klein, 1992); is related to more compliance on debt obligations from borrowers (Karapetyan 
& Stacescu, 2014a);  reduces bank credit risks (Kusi et al., 2017); mitigates funding cost 
(Kusi & Opoku Mensah,  2018) and is more beneficial for financial access in countries with 
English common tradition in relation to their counterparts with French civil law tradition 
(Muaza & Alagidede, 2017).  
     The second strand of the literature articulates the negative aspects of information 
sharing between banks. Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2004) established that the systematic 
sharing of information is positively linked to banking crisis whereas Jappelli and Pagano 
(2006) propose that such information sharing has the tendency to increase risky lending 
and/or the extension of more funds to borrowers that may not eventually comply with their 
financial obligations towards banks. In summary, it is argued in this strand of the literature 
that increased sharing of information by credit registries motivates banks to look for other 
channels of improving their competitive positions. This may involve collecting strategic 
information that is not subsequently disclosed to information sharing offices 
(Vercammen,1995; Petersen & Rajan, 1995; Hauswald & Marquez, 2003; Karapetyan & 
Stacescu, 2014a, 2014b). Irrespective of positions adopted by the two contending strands, by 
conception and definition, the mission of information sharing offices is facilitated by ICT.  
2.3 ICT, information sharing and financial access 
While information sharing has been shown to impact on loan price and quantity 
provided by financial institutions (Triki & Gagigo, 2014; Asongu, 2017), the channel through 
which  ICT interacts with offices involved in the sharing of information to affect loan price 
and quantity of loans has not been discussed in the literature. Hence, this section further 
substantiates the positioning of the study by justifying how the banking industry collects and 
shares information with credit registries through the use of technology platforms like mobile 
phones and internet in order to improve and/or make adjustments to loan prices and quantity 
of loans.  
ICT is a policy instrument for improving the work of information sharing offices 
because it is logically connected with the goal of disseminating information and reducing 
information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers. Therefore, in order to collect and 
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share information with banks, credit bureaus are very likely to use ICT mechanisms. 
Moreover, according to Hellstrom (2008), ICT enables transparency through the free-flow of 
information by credit agencies online. For instance, Asongu et al. (2018c) recently reported 
that the sharing of information by means of ICT in the banking sector reduces market power 
for financial access because, ICT enables, inter alia: (i) the free flow of information and (ii) 
credit registries to distribute information more effectively. They further argued that ICT 
enables financial institutions to have up-to-date information, encourages the participation of 
customers in the lending process, reduces informational rents previously enjoyed by big banks 
and reduces the abuse of market power by large financial institutions.  
To summarize, the use of ICT by information sharing offices has the potential to 
reduce information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders. Firstly, ex-ante of lending, the 
complementarity between ICT and information sharing offices reduces the risk of adverse 
selection faced by banks. Such enables them to have more timely and accurate information 
about borrowers’ creditworthiness. Secondly, ex-post of lending, moral hazard might be 
considerably reduced because the diffusion of information enables  credit registries to educate 
borrowers on the relevance of accountability and transparency. Such reduces the likelihood 
that borrowers will default on their debts once credit has been obtained. It is suggested that 
information sharing offices are most likely to use various ICT mechanisms to communicate 
with borrowers and their lenders in an effort to reduce moral hazard. Third, the sharing of 
information by means of ICT has the potential to reduce informational rents enjoyed by a few 
large sized financial institutions within the banking sector. Such increases financial sector 
competition and access to financial services including savings and loan extension (Asongu & 
Nwachukwu, 2017). This is essentially because ICT reduces the power of those institutions 
with privileged market information, decentralises information and reduces information 
monopoly (Snow, 2009). This perspective conforms to the literature on the relevance of ICT 
in management effectiveness (Boulianne, 2009; Diamond, 2010; Pierskalla & Hollenbach, 
2013; Grossman et al., 2014; Weidmann & Shapiro, 2015; Manacorda & Tesei, 2016). It is 
reasonable to propose that such  management effectiveness naturally extends to the banking 
industry.  
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 The list of countries we are studying is available in Appendix 5. 
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3. Data and Methodology
3.1 Data 
We examine a panel of 162 banks in 42 African countries
3
, with data from the World Bank 
Development Indicators and Bankscope, for the period 2001-2011. The periodicity, choice of 
countries and number banks are constrained by data availability.  For example, information on 
credit bureaus from the World Bank Development indicators is only available from 2001. In 
accordance with Coccorese and Pellecchia (2010), dependent variables for ‘loan price’ and 
‘loan quantity’ are respectively the ‘price charged on loans’ and ‘logarithms of loans’. These 
variables are used as proxies for financial access in line with the recent financial development 
literature (Asongu, 2017; Asongu et al. 2018b). We have already explained how loan price 
and quantity are associated with financial access in Section 2.2.1. These dependent variables 
are also persistent because of a high correlation between their contemporary and lagged 
values. Moreover, substantial differences between minimum and maximum values of the 
dependent variables are clearly apparent. As will be discussed in subsequent sections, the 
persistence and high range of the dependent variables provides justification for the use of 
Generalized Method of Moments and Quantile regressions as estimation strategies.  
Consistent with Triki and Gajigo (2014), information sharing offices are measured 
with public credit registries (PCRs) and private credit bureaus (PCBs). Internet penetration 
and mobile phone penetration are used to measure ICT. Market-oriented features (GDP per 
capita growth, inflation and population density), bank-related characteristics (Deposits/Assets 
and Bank branches) and binary dummy variables for the unobserved heterogeneity are used as 
control indicators. The dummies include the following bank attributes: ownership (foreign 
versus vs. domestic), size (large vs. small) and ‘compliance with Sharia finance’ (Islamic vs. 
non-Islamic).  
In line with economic theory, we expect the following signs with regard to bank-
oriented features. We expect the ‘deposit to asset ratio’ should increase both the quantity and 
price of loans. This is because deposits are the principal source of bank financing. A higher 
proportion of deposits in liquid liabilities can increase loan quantity and/or interest rate 
charges, since good organisation is necessary for effective mobilisation of savings and its 
management. Intuitively, an increase in the number of bank branches should raise the loan 
quantity as well as the price of loans. This last is primarily due to the higher overhead costs. 
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With regards to market-related features, the following signs are expected. 
Theoretically speaking, GDP per capita (which is included to account for business cycle 
fluctuations) is expected to influence the quantity of loans positively. Conversely, the 
anticipated sign for loan price is ambiguous because it is contingent on market dynamism and 
expansion.  For example, if GDP per capita is decreasing over time, it can affect both loan 
price and quantity negatively as a result of falling demand. We anticipate negative signs 
because the population on average across Africa has been growing at a faster rate than GDP, 
leading to a declining GDP per capita for this period (Asongu, 2013a). Population density is 
anticipated to raise both the price and quantity of loans.  This is because a growing demand 
for loans, owing to high density in population, increases loan price. Moreover, we suggest that 
inflation is likely to decrease the quantity of loans and increase the price of loans. This is 
essentially because investors prefer to invest in economic environments that are less 
ambiguous (see Kelsey, & le Roux, 2017a, 2017b).  Hence, given that less investment are 
observed during periods of economic uncertainty (e.g. inflation), loan quantity is predicted to 
fall. By contrast, the price of loans is predicted to increase with inflation because the nominal 
interest rates levied on loans are usually adjusted for inflation.  
Establishing the anticipated signs for the dummy variables is difficult. For example 
both small and big banks (for bank size heterogeneity) can be associated with positive and 
negative effects resulting from loan dynamics, though big banks are comparatively more 
efficient at managing and coordinating the several processes needed to improve access to 
financial services.  Furthermore, addressing the challenges that come with increasing bank 
size is also a cause of inefficiency, owing to problems encountered with resolving the 
compliants of  a growing customer base.   Similarly, the incidence of foreign versus domestic 
banks (ownership heterogeneity) and Islamic versus non-Islamic banks (compliance with 
Sharia finance) depends on a multitude of features, which include: market dynamism and 
expansion as well as staffs’ organisational capabilities.  
Appendix 1 summarizes the expected signs of the control variables and Appendix 2 
provides the definitions and sources of variables employed in the study. Appendix 3 and 
Appendix 4 present the summary statistics and correlation matrix in that order.  
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12 
(4) Biases in the difference estimator are addressed with the system estimator.
(5) Cross-country variations are incorporated into the specifications.
As shown by Bond et al. (2001), the system GMM estimator used by Arellano and 
Bond (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) has better estimation properties than the 
difference estimator used in Arellano and Bond (1991). This inquiry adopts an extension by 
Roodman (2009ab) of Arellano and Bover (1995) which uses forward orthogonal deviations 
instead of first differences. The advantages of such a modified empirical strategy  were 
documented by Baltagi (2008) and Love and Zicchino (2006) to include a restriction on over-
identification or limitation on instrument proliferation. In the specification, a two-step 
approach is adopted because it controls for heteroscedasticity.  
The following equations in levels (1) and first difference (2) summarize the estimation 
procedure for loan quantity.  
tititih
h
htititititi WInterICTISOLQLQ ,,,
5
1
,4,3,2,10, εξηδσσσσσ ττ ++++++++= −
=
− ∑  (1)
τττττ
τττττ
εξξδσ
σσσ
−−−−
=
−
−−−−−
+−+−+−+
−+−+−=−
∑ titttihtih
h
htiti
titititititititi
WWInterInter
ICTICTISOISOLQLQLQLQ
,2,,,,
5
1
,,4
,,3,,22,,1,,
)()()(
)()()(
 ,     (2) 
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3.2 Methodology  
3.2.1 Generalised methods of moments: specification, identification and exclusion restrictions 
The GMM empirical approach is adopted by this inquiry for five principal reasons. 
While the first-two are basic requirements for using the estimation strategy, the last-three are 
advantages that are associated with the choice of the empirical approach (Tchamyou, 2018; 
Tchamyou et al., 2018).  
(1) The empirical approach takes into account persistence in loan quantity and price given that 
the criterion or rule of thumb to ascertain persistence in the two dependent variables is met. 
The correlation between loan price and loan quantity and their first lags are respectively 0.845 
and 0.996, which are above the 0.800 rule of thumb.  
(2) The N (or 162)>T(or 11) criterion needed for a GMM technique is also met given that the 
number of time series in each cross section is lower than the number of cross sections. 
(3) Endogeneity is accounted for in all regressors by the estimation technique because 
instrumental variables are employed for suspected endogenous regressors. Moreover, the use 
of time-invariant omitted variables also helps to control for endogeneity.  
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where tiLQ , is the loan quantity of bank i at  period t ; ISO  is an information sharing office 
(PCR (Private Credit Registries) or PCB (Public Credit Bureaus)); 0σ is a constant; τ is the
degree of auto-regression; W  is the vector of control variables  (GDP per capita growth, 
Inflation, Population density, Deposit/Assets  and Bank Branches), iη is the country-specific 
effect, tξ is the time-specific constant  and ti,ε the error term. Dummy variables are not
included in the GMM specifications because fixed effects are eliminated.   Equations (1) and 
(2) are replicated when the dependent variable is loan price.
With regards to exclusion restrictions and identification, all explanatory variables are 
considered as potential endogenous or predetermined variables whereas only years are 
acknowledged to be strictly exogenous (this is consistent with Dewan & Ramaprasad, 2014; 
Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016a; Tchamyou, 2018), essentially because it is not likely for years 
to become endogenous in first difference (see Roodman, 2009b). Therefore, the procedure for 
treating ivstyle (years) is ‘iv (years, eq(diff))’ whereas the gmmstyle is used for suspected 
endogeneous variables.  
With the above background, the strictly exogenous instruments or years influence the 
outcome variables exclusively through the suspected endogenous or predetermined variables. 
Furthermore, the statistical validity of the exclusion restriction is assessed with the Difference 
in Hansen Test (DHT) for instrument exogeneity.  Accordingly, the null hypothesis of this test 
should not be rejected for the instruments to elucidate loan quantity and loan price exclusively 
via the predetermined variables. Hence, whereas in the standard instrumental variable (IV) 
estimation technique, failure to reject the null hypothesis of the Sargan Overidentifying 
Restrictions (OIR) test is an indication that instruments do not elicit the outcome variable 
beyond the endogenous variables (see Beck et al., 2003; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016b; 
Boateng et al., 2018), in the GMM approach which employs forward orthogonal deviations, 
the information criterion employed to investigate if years exhibit strict exogeneity is the DHT. 
Therefore, in the findings that are reported in Section 4, the exclusion restriction assumption 
is validated if the alternative hypothesis of the DHT corresponding to IV (year, eq(diff)) is 
rejected. 
3.2.2 Instrumental Quantile regressions 
In order to account for existing levels of loan price and loan quantity, the current study 
employs the Quantile Regressions (QR) technique. This technique is consistent with the 
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( ) iPCBPCB i,ti,ti,t η +ε+=α +δ j −1 ,  (3) 
where, i,tPCB , is the private credit bureaus indicator of bank i at  period t ,   α is a constant,
PCB i ,t−1 i, represents  private credit bureaus in bank i at  period t −1 ,η is the bank-specific
effects and i,tε the error term.
( ) iInternetInternet i,ti,ti,t η +ε+=α +δ j −1 ,  (4) 
where, i ,tInternet , is the internet penetration rate of bank i at  period t ,   α is a constant,
i ,t−1Internet i, represents  internet penetration rate in bank i at  period t −1 ,η is the bank-
specific effects and i,tε the error term.
The procedure of instrumentation in Eq. (3) consists of regressing the information 
sharing offices on their first lags. The corresponding fitted values are then saved and later 
used as the independent variables of interest in Eq. (5). The specifications are 
Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) in standard errors. The θ th quantile
estimator of loan quantity and loan price is obtained by solving for the following optimization 
problem, which is disclosed without subscripts for simplicity in Eq. (5) 
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literature on conditional determinants (see Keonker & Hallock, 2001; Billger & Goel, 2009; 
Okada & Samreth, 2012; Asongu, 2013b; Tchamyou & Asongu, 2017b). The approach 
consists of assessing the nexus between information sharing offices and the outcome variables 
throughout the conditional distributions of loan price and quantity, with particular emphasis 
on banks with low, intermediate and high levels of financial access. 
The existing literature on information sharing has been oriented towards the 
conditional mean of financial access (see Asongu et al., 2016b; Triki & Gajigo, 2014).  While 
mean effects are relevant, the underlying literature is extended with an estimation approach 
that controls for existing levels of loan price and quantity. In addition, studies that use 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) to emphasise mean effects is based on the assumption that 
error terms are normally distributed. However, with QR, the hypothesis of normally 
distributed errors does not hold. In addition, the QR is robust to presence of outliers because 
parameters are estimated at various points in the conditional distribution of the dependent 
variable (Koenker & Bassett, 1978). 
The concern about endogeneity is addressed by using an Instrumental Variable QR 
(IVQR) procedure. The instrumentation procedures for an information sharing office (e.g. 
private credit bureaus) and an ICT indicator (e.g. Internet penetration) are respectively in Eqs. 
(3) and (4) below.
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where, ( )1,0∈θ .
As opposed to OLS that is fundamentally based on minimizing the sum of squared residuals, 
with QR, the weighted sum of absolute deviations are minimised. For example, the 10
th
 decile
or 25
th
 quartile (with θ =0.10 or 0.25 respectively) are examined by approximately weighing
the residuals. The conditional quantile of financial access or iy given ix is: 
θβθ iiy xxQ ′=)/( ,                                                                                      (6) 
where, unique slope parameters are modelled for each θ th specific quantile.
This formulation is analogous to βixxyE ′=)/( in the OLS slope where parameters are 
investigated only at the mean of the conditional distribution of loan quantity and price. 
For the model in Eq. (6), the dependent variable iy  is  either loan quantity or loan price 
whereas ix  contains a constant term, public credit registries, private credit bureaus, ICT, 
GDP per capita growth, Inflation, Population density, Deposit/Assets, Bank Branches, Small 
banks, Domestic banks and Islamic banks. 
4. Empirical results
4.1 Presentation of results 
Table 1 and Table 2 present GMM results related to loan price and loan quantity respectively. 
Each table has eight specifications, consisting of four specifications pertaining respectively to 
public credit registries and private credit bureaus. Each of the set of four specifications has 
two sub-sets of specifications pertaining respectively to mobile phone and internet 
penetrations. Each of the ICT-related specification embodies two more sub-specifications 
reflecting a full sample and a partial sample.  
The full sample is from 2001-2011 while the partial sample is from 2005-2011. Two main 
reasons motivate the choice of a partial sample. It enables the study to limit concerns about 
over-identification or instrument proliferation because T is reduced from 11 to 7.  Moreover, 
the data on information sharing offices in most countries is only available from the year 2005.  
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4
 “First, the null hypothesis of the second-order Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test (AR(2)) in difference for 
the absence of autocorrelation in the residuals should not be rejected. Second the Sargan and Hansen over-
identification restrictions (OIR) tests should not be significant because their null hypotheses are the positions 
that instruments are valid or not correlated with the error terms. In essence, while the Sargan OIR test is not 
robust but not weakened by instruments, the Hansen OIR is robust but weakened by instruments. In order to 
restrict identification or limit the proliferation of instruments, we have ensured that instruments are lower than 
the number of cross-sections in most specifications. Third, the Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for exogeneity of 
instruments is also employed to assess the validity of results from the Hansen OIR test. Fourth, a Fischer test for 
the joint validity of estimated coefficients is also provided” (Asongu & De Moor, 2017, p.200). 
International Journal of Managerial Finance
We employ four principal information criteria to assess the validity of the GMM 
model with forward orthogonal deviations.
4
 Based on the information criteria, the following 
findings can be confirmed. From the third specification in Table 1, we see that the net effect 
from the interaction between public credit registries and mobile phones is 0.00198 ((i.e., 
[-0.00003 × 34.107] + 0.003), when the mean value of mobile phone penetration is 34.107, 
the unconditional effect of public credit registries (PCRs) equals (0.003), while the 
corresponding conditional impact of PCRs is found to be (-0.00003). Consequently, we 
conclude that there is a negative marginal effect and a positive net effect, for the role 
of mobile phones in facilitating the essential characteristics of public credit registries for 
improving access to financial services where the management of loan prices are concerned. 
In Table 2, we find that there is a positive net effect from the interaction between private 
credit bureaus and mobile phones (of 0.0006).  We find that the significant control variables 
in Tables 1 and 2, have the expected signs as hypothesised in Section 3.1.  
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Table 1: Price Effects of Reducing Information Asymmetry (GMM) 
Dependent variable: Price of Loans 
Public  Credit Registries (PCR) Private Credit Bureaus (PCB) 
Mobile Phones Internet Mobile Phones Internet 
Full 
Sample 
Partial 
Sample 
Full 
Sample 
Partial 
Sample 
Full Sample Partial 
Sample 
Full 
Sample 
Partial 
Sample 
Constant  -0.006 0.143 -0.001 -0.094* 0.0008 0.164*** -0.016* 0.021 
(0.576) (0.149) (0.848) (0.068) (0.927) (0.000) (0.058) (0.614) 
Price of Loans (-1) 0.686*** 0.803*** 0.640*** 0.781*** 0.653*** 0.838*** 0.690*** 0.853*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mobile Phones 0.00002 0.0001** --- --- 0.00003 -0.00008 --- --- 
(0.706) (0.048) (0.663) (0.343) 
Internet  --- --- 0.0001 -0.0002 --- --- 0.0008*** 0.0001 
(0.373) (0.283) (0.000) (0.313) 
PCR  -0.002** 0.003*** -0.001** -0.0003 --- --- --- --- 
(0.010) (0.002) (0.022) (0.503) 
PCB  --- --- --- --- 0.0005*** 0.00003 0.0002*** 0.00005 
(0.000) (0.851) (0.006) (0.510) 
PCR × Mobile Phones 0.00001** -0.00003*** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
(0.024) (0.001) 
PCB × Mobile Phones --- --- --- --- -0.000005*** 0.0000006 --- --- 
(0.000) (0.730) 
PCR × Internet --- --- 0.00002* 0.000002 --- --- --- --- 
(0.087) (0.878) 
PCB × Internet --- --- --- --- --- --- -
0.00001*** 
-0.000001 
(0.009) (0.799) 
GDPpcg 0.0007** -0.0003 0.0007* -0.0001 0.0003 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0003 
(0.032) (0.478) (0.055) (0.804) (0.275) (0.730) (0.657) (0.331) 
Inflation  0.0006*** 0.001*** 0.0008*** 0.001*** 0.0005*** 0.0004 0.0008*** 0.0008*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.130) (0.000) (0.001) 
Pop. density 0.00002** 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.00004*** 0.00001 0.00004*** 0.0000007 
(0.041) (0.148) (0.100) (0.400) (0.002) (0.333) (0.001) (0.430) 
Deposit/Assets 0.038*** 0.025*** 0.035*** 0.050** 0.046*** 0.014 0.045*** 0.035** 
(0.001) (0.004) (0.000) (0.029) (0.000) (0.427) (0.000) (0.036) 
Bank Branches -0.00002 -0.0007** -0.0003 0.0001 -0.0007*** -0.0002 -0.001*** -0.0004 
(0.923) (0.010) (0.347) (0.573) (0.002) (0.371) (0.000) (0.168) 
Net effect of the Mobile  nsa 0.0019 --- --- nsa na --- ---
Net effect of the Internet --- --- nsa na --- --- nsa na 
AR(1) (0.000) (0.088) (0.000) (0.296) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.221) 
AR(2) (0.811) (0.189) (0.803) (0.433) (0.850) (0.693) (0.847) (0.355) 
Sargan OIR (0.001) (0.671) (0.238) (0.918) (0.000) (0.407) (0.000) (0.205) 
Hansen OIR (0.006) (0.309) (0.072) (0.541) (0.003) (0.057) (0.041) (0.069) 
DHT for instruments 
(a)Instruments in levels 
H excluding group (0.003) (0.090) (0.038) (0.767) (0.010) (0.296) (0.020) (0.958) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.159) (0.647) (0.295) (0.345) (0.032) (0.053) (0.253) (0.012) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))
H excluding group (0.072) (0.181) (0.148) (0.501) (0.085) (0.012) (0.033) (0.038) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.008) (0.734) (0.110) (0.506) (0.002) (0.954) (0.325) (0.540) 
Fisher  70.20*** 105.40*** 71.88*** 61.99*** 48.89 *** 109.18*** 41.94*** 83.38*** 
Instruments  42 41 42 41 42 40 42 40 
Banks 144 112 144 111 144 109 144 108 
Observations  698 140 679 139 690 138 671 137 
*, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. 
Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated 
coefficients, Hausman test and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the 
AR(1)andAR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. na: not applicable due to the insignificance of marginal 
effects. nsa: not specifically applicable because the information criteria does not valid the model.  
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Table 2: Quantity Effects of Reducing Information Asymmetry (GMM) 
Dependent variable: Quantity of Loans 
Public  Credit Registries (PCR) Private Credit Bureaus (PCB) 
Mobile Phones Internet Mobile Phones Internet 
Full 
Sample 
Partial 
Sample 
Full 
Sample 
Partial 
Sample 
Full 
Sample 
Partial 
Sample 
Full 
Sample 
Partial 
Sample 
Constant  0.306*** 0.089 0.118** -0.255 0.264*** 0.004 0.210*** 0.150 
(0.000) (0.575) (0.042) (0.125) (0.000) (0.954) (0.000) (0.117) 
Quantity of Loans (-1) 0.934*** 1.009*** 0.962*** 0.995*** 0.935*** 0.997*** 0.951*** 0.994*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mobile Phones -0.002*** -0.0006 --- --- -0.002*** 0.00004 --- --- 
(0.000) (0.108) (0.000) (0.899) 
Internet  --- --- -0.002** 0.001 --- --- -0.003** 0.001 
(0.026) (0.186) (0.012) (0.166) 
PCR  0.004 -0.002 0.003 0.005* --- --- --- --- 
(0.474) (0.782) (0.207) (0.054) 
PCB  --- --- --- --- 0.0004 0.001** -0.0003 0.0005 
(0.632) (0.026) (0.548) (0.213) 
PCR×Mobile Phones -0.00004 0.00002 --- --- 0.000004 --- --- --- 
(0.481) (0.736) (0.544) 
PCB×Mobile Phones --- --- --- --- --- -0.00001** --- --- 
(0.017) 
PCR×Internet --- --- -0.0001 -0.0001 --- --- --- --- 
(0.107) (0.124) 
PCB×Internet --- --- ---- --- --- --- 0.00001 -0.00006** 
(0.515) (0.044) 
GDPpcg 0.004** 0.007*** 0.004** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.003 0.042** 0.005*** 
(0.026) (0.003) (0.022) (0.003) (0.001) (0.185) (0.015) (0.000) 
Inflation  0.0003 -0.001* 0.001 0.00003 0.001** 0.0006 0.001* -0.0003 
(0.708) (0.058) (0.226) (0.970) (0.026) (0.546) (0.089) (0.637) 
Pop. density -0.0002** 0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00005 -0.0001** 0.00001 -0.00006 -0.00003 
(0.013) (0.826) (0.678) (0.468) (0.016) (0.719) (0.304) (0.447) 
Deposit/Assets 0.023 0.039 0.124 0.177** 0.059 0.136 0.090 0.119 
(0.803) (0.713) (0.157) (0.042) (0.471) (0.178) (0.223) (0.102) 
Bank Branches 0.005** -0.002 0.001 -0.005*** 0.003* -0.002** 0.001 -0.004*** 
(0.012) (0.251) (0.294) (0.000) (0.073) (0.060) (0.666) (0.006) 
Net effect of the Mobile  na na --- --- na 0.0006 --- ---
Net effect of the Internet --- --- na na --- --- na na 
AR(1) (0.000) (0.533) (0.000) (0.919) (0.000) (0.187) (0.000) (0.877) 
AR(2) (0.754) (0.894) (0.694) (0.951) (0.734) (0.806) (0.737) (0.247) 
Sargan OIR (0.000) (0.065) (0.000) (0.007) (0.003) (0.007) (0.000) (0.015) 
Hansen OIR (0.038) (0.434) (0.001) (0.627) (0.041) (0.288) (0.017) (0.637) 
DHT for instruments 
(a)Instruments in levels 
H excluding group (0.611) (0.302) (0.742) (0.262) (0.286) (0.514) (0.433) (0.481) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.013) (0.523) (0.000) (0.793) (0.036) (0.220) (0.008) (0.630) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))
H excluding group (0.038) (0.525) (0.005) (0.609) (0.023) (0.337) (0.018) (0.657) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.258) (0.233) (0.055) (0.489) (0.455) (0.238) (0.217) (0.412) 
Fisher  761.21*** 1665.19*** 1553.32*** 3038.86*** 896.39*** 3991.86*** 885.73*** 2475.98*** 
Instruments  42 39 42 41 42 37 42 39 
Banks 145 115 145 113 145 112 145 110 
Observations  735 145 713 143 728 144 706 142 
*, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. 
Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of 
estimated coefficients, Hausman test and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no 
autocorrelation in the AR(1)andAR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. na: not applicable due to the 
insignificance of marginal effects.  
Tables 3-6 present IVQR related findings. In particular, Tables 3-4 are related to the 
relationships between ICT and public credit registries while Tables 5-6 focus on the 
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connections between ICT and private credit bureaus. For each information sharing office, one 
table concentrates on loan price (Table 3 and Table 5) while the other is on loan quantity 
(Table 4 and Table 6).  
See Tables 1-2, for the findings in terms of marginal and net effects; for the purpose of 
the computation of net effects, mean values are based on instrumented ICT values, notably: 
37.019 is the instrumented mean value of mobile phone penetration whereas 7.809 is the 
instrumented mean value of internet penetration. For all tables: (i) the consistent differences 
in estimated coefficients in OLS versus quantiles (with respect to sign, significance and 
magnitude of significance) justify the relevance of the QR empirical strategy and (ii) ‘mobile 
phone’-related regressions are disclosed on the left-hand-side whereas internet-oriented 
estimations are presented on the right-hand-side.   
The following findings are observed from Table 3 on price effects of public credit 
registries with ICT: The net effect from the interaction between public credit registries and 
mobile phones is negative for the  bottom quantiles; while the net effect from the interaction 
between public credit registries and internet is positive from the 25
th
 to the 75
th
 quartiles. In 
Table 4 on loan effects from public credit registries with ICT, the net effect from the 
interaction between public credit registries and the mobile phone is positive in the 25
th 
quartile whereas the net effect from the interaction between public credit registries and the 
internet is positive only in the 25
th
 and 50
th
 quartiles.
In Table 5, private credit bureaus with the internet have a positive net effect on loan 
prices in the 75
th
 quartile. In Table 6, private credit bureaus with the internet (mobile phone) 
have a negative net effect on loan quantity in the 50
th
 quartile (from the 10
th
 decile to the 75
th 
quartile). The corresponding positive marginal effects from the interaction with mobile 
phones is an indication that positive net effect from mobile phones can be reached  if certain 
thresholds of mobile phones are attained. Most of the significant control variables have the 
expected signs.  
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Table 3: Price Effects of Public Credit Registries with ICT (IVQR) 
Dependent variable: Price of Loans 
Mobile Phones Internet 
OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
Constant  -0.084*** 0.071*** 0.065*** 0.073*** 0.095*** 0.098*** 0.083*** 0.045*** 0.065*** 0.084*** 0.097*** 0.094*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mobile Phones(IV) -0.0001* -0.0004*** -0.0001** -0.00004 -0.00008 -0.00006 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
(0.091) (0.000) (0.018) (0.590) (0.354) (0.603) 
Internet (IV) --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.0007*** -0.0005 -0.0004* -0.0006** -0.001*** -0.001** 
(0.008) (0.174) (0.084) (0.025) (0.000) (0.019) 
PCR (IV) -0.002*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.002* -0.001 -0.002 -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.002 
(0.008) (0.004) (0.000) (0.083) (0.295) (0.293) (0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.180) 
PCR(IV) ×Mobile Phones(IV) 0.00001 0.00002* 0.00002*** 0.000009 0.000002 0.000004 --- --- --- --- --- ---
(0.241) (0.082) (0.006) (0.475) (0.868) (0.835) 
PCR(IV) ×Internet(IV) --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.00005** 0.00002 0.00005** 0.00006** 0.00007** 0.00003 
(0.026) (0.483) (0.016) (0.025) (0.031) (0.583) 
GDPpcg -0.0008** -0.0009 -0.00001 -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.001** -0.0006 0.0001 -0.00002 -0.0004 -0.001** -0.0009 
(0.046) (0.105) (0.975) (0.247) (0.233) (0.046) (0.114) (0.869) (0.956) (0.303) (0.011) (0.153) 
Inflation  0.001*** 0.0001 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.001*** 0.0005 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 
(0.000) (0.837) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.423) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Pop. density 0.00006*** 0.00004 0.00006*** 0.00008*** 0.00006*** 0.00006*** 0.00007*** 0.00007 0.00007*** 0.00009*** 0.0001*** 0.00006*** 
(0.001) (0.185) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.007) (0.000) (0.130) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
Deposit/Assets 0.017** 0.007 0.017*** 0.020** 0.017* 0.036*** 0.015** 0.007 0.015** 0.006 0.021*** 0.042*** 
(0.019) (0.503) (0.004) (0.012) (0.050) (0.008) (0.033) (0.569) (0.035) (0.407) (0.005) (0.001) 
Bank Branches -0.0005 0.001** -0.0007** -0.001*** -0.0009** -0.0001 -0.00005 0.001 -0.0006 -0.0003 0.0009* 0.0003 
(0.120) (0.022) (0.017) (0.008) (0.032) (0.734) (0.914) (0.158) (0.142) (0.459) (0.096) (0.740) 
Small Banks  0.008** 0.012** 0.011*** 0.001 0.002 0.008 0.007* 0.015** 0.008* 0.003 0.003 0.009 
(0.027) (0.043) (0.001) (0.717) (0.605) (0.233) (0.072) (0.046) (0.058) (0.537) (0.506) (0.173) 
Domestic Banks 0.001 -0.010** -0.002 0.007** 0.008** 0.001 0.001 -0.014** -0.001 0.005 0.004 0.002 
(0.560) (0.026) (0.362) (0.041) (0.046) (0.852) (0.700) (0.022) (0.759) (0.118) (0.192) (0.635) 
Islamic Banks  -0.017*** -0.003 -0.016** -0.015* -0.014 -0.013 -0.012* 0.009 -0.013 -0.012 0.004 0.001 
(0.009) (0.791) (0.016) (0.093) (0.175) (0.347) (0.091) (0.570) (0.160) (0.248) (0.661) (0.946) 
Net effect of the Mobile  na -0.0032 -0.0022 na na na --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Net effect of the Internet --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.0026 na -0.0026 -0.0025 -0.0034 na 
Pseudo R²/R² 0.216 0.116 0.150 0.158 0.149 0.136 0.222 0.093 0.151 0.169 0.173 0.142 
Fisher  21.67*** 22.71*** 
Observations  728 728 728 728 728 728 700 700 700 700 700 700 
***,**,*: significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. IV: Instrumented Variable. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. R² (Pseudo R²) for OLS (Quantile Regressions). Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations 
where Market Power is least. na: not applicable due to the insignificance of marginal effects. 
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Table 4: Quantity Effects of Public Credit Registries with ICT (IVQR) 
Dependent variable: Quantity of Loans 
Mobile Phones Internet 
OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
Constant  3.806*** 2.762*** 2.982*** 3.361*** 4.596*** 4.943*** 3.920*** 2.752*** 2.970*** 3.495*** 4.492*** 5.400*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mobile Phones(IV) 0.003* 0.004** 0.003 0.003 0.006** 0.005*** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
(0.088) (0.012) (0.337) (0.288) (0.011) (0.002) 
Internet (IV) --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.039*** 0.020*** 0.030** 0.063*** 0.035*** 0.021*** 
(0.000) (0.0006) (0.022) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
PCR (IV) 0.066** 0.104*** 0.064 0.080 -0.016 -0.049 0.075*** 0.088*** 0.081* 0.101** 0.012 -0.005 
(0.016) (0.001) (0.300) (0.222) (0.719) (0.229) (0.000) (0.000) (0.052) (0.016) (0.637) (0.734) 
PCR(IV)×Mobile Phones(IV) -0.0005** -0.0008*** -0.0003 -0.0006 0.00009 0.0004 --- --- --- --- --- ---
(0.045) (0.006) (0.615) (0.302) (0.836) (0.220) 
PCR(IV) ×Internet(IV) --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002 -0.002** -0.0001 0.0002 
(0.003) (0.000) (0.125) (0.033) (0.821) (0.606) 
GDPpcg -0.014 0.020** -0.019 -0.031 0.002 -0.014 -0.018 0.020** -0.031* -0.031 -0.008 -0.027 
(0.221) (0.048) (0.317) (0.191) (0.856) (0.129) (0.118) (0.032) (0.083) (0.174) (0.574) (0.027) 
Inflation  -0.024*** -0.004 -0.010 -0.031** -0.025*** -0.002 -0.022*** -0.008 -0.010 -0.028* -0.022*** -0.007 
(0.000) (0.329) (0.329) (0.025) (0.005) (0.637) (0.001) (0.160) (0.344) (0.058) (0.006) (0.309) 
Pop. density -0.001*** -0.0007** -0.001** -0.0007 -0.001* -0.001** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.0009 -0.001*** -0.0009* 
(0.002) (0.013) (0.024) (0.386) (0.050) (0.018) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.263) (0.001) (0.065) 
Deposit/Assets 1.867*** 1.057*** 2.034*** 2.544*** 1.306*** 1.279*** 1.741*** 1.217*** 2.063*** 2.432*** 1.173*** 1.018*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Bank Branches -0.063*** -0.043*** -0.055*** -0.072*** -0.052*** -0.052*** -0.100*** -0.056*** -0.075*** -0.140*** -0.095*** -0.078*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Small Banks  -0.775*** -1.190*** -1.268*** -0.715*** -0.326** -0.250** -0.820*** -1.010*** -1.171*** -0.872*** -0.457*** -0.418*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.028) (0.012) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Domestic Banks 0.401*** 0.078 0.408** 0.460** 0.440*** 0.436*** 0.451*** 0.117 0.447*** 0.523*** 0.606*** 0.600*** 
(0.000) (0.378) (0.010) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.253) (0.005) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) 
Islamic Banks  -0.587*** 0.322** -0.085 -0.287 -1.193*** -1.340*** -0.546*** 0.081 0.104 -0.357 -0.982*** -1.205*** 
(0.000) (0.031) (0.822) (0.481) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.726) (0.815) (0.487) (0.003) (0.000) 
Net effect of the Mobile  0.0474 0.0743 na na na na --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Net effect of the Internet --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.0593 0.0723 na 0.0853 na na 
Pseudo R²/R² 0.198 0.085 0.115 0.152 0.111 0.126 0.206 0.089 0.125 0.150 0.111 0.117 
Fisher  31.37*** 27.13*** 
Observations  751 751 751 751 751 751 719 719 719 719 719 719 
***,**,*: significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. IV: Instrumented Variable. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. R² (Pseudo R²) for OLS (Quantile Regressions). Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations 
where Market Power is least. na: not applicable due to the insignificance of marginal effects. 
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Table 5: Price Effects of Private Credit  Bureaus  with ICT (IVQR) 
Dependent variable: Price of Loans 
Mobile Phones Internet 
OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
Constant  0.080*** 0.067*** 0.077*** 0.077*** 0.084*** 0.093*** 0.078*** 0.061*** 0.057*** 0.069*** 0.084*** 0.091*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mobile Phones(IV) -0.0002*** -0.0003*** -0.0005*** -0.0003*** -0.0002** -0.0001 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.042) (0.355) 
Internet (IV) --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.0003 -0.0003 0.0006 0.0005** 0.00006 0.00001 
(0.247) (0.329) (0.127) (0.035) (0.865) (0.976) 
PCB (IV) 0.0008*** 0.0002 0.0001 0.0006** 0.0006* 0.001*** 0.0009*** 0.0007*** 0.0008*** 0.0006*** 0.0006** 0.0009*** 
(0.007) (0.540) (0.678) (0.017) (0.081) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.010) (0.006) 
PCB(IV)×Mobile Phones(IV) -0.000001 0.000006 0.0000007* -0.0000004 -0.000001 -0.000005 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
(0.684) (0.142) (0.094) (0.894) (0.670) (0.209) 
PCB(IV)×Internet(IV) --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.00003*** -0.000004 -0.00003 -0.00002 -0.00004* -0.00004 
(0.000) (0.700) (0.186) (0.174) (0.071) (0.120) 
GDPpcg -0.0009** -0.001** -0.0007 -0.001** 0.0004 0.0006 -0.0004 0.00005 0.0001 -0.0002 0.0001 0.0005 
(0.038) (0.012) (0.284) (0.024) (0.405) (0.316) (0.316) (0.936) (0.851) (0.535) (0.734) (0.264) 
Inflation  0.001*** 0.0002 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.0005 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
(0.000) (0.620) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.283) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Pop. density 0.00004*** 0.00003 0.00003 0.00004*** 0.00005*** 0.00007*** 0.00005*** 0.00005** 0.00004** 0.00005*** 0.00006*** 0.00007*** 
(0.000) (0.103) (0.189) (0.004) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.015) (0.048) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Deposit/Assets 0.022*** 0.008 0.014 0.024*** 0.026*** 0.038*** 0.020*** -0.001 0.017 0.016** 0.021** 0.042*** 
(0.001) (0.347) (0.209) (0.001) (0.005) (0.000) (0.004) (0.872) (0.148) (0.017) (0.020) (0.000) 
Bank Branches -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.0004 -0.0009*** -0.001** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.001*** -0.002**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.308) (0.008) (0.029) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.018) 
Small Banks  0.009** 0.012** 0.006 0.002 0.004 0.010 0.005 0.008 0.002 0.001 0.005 0.007 
(0.012) (0.025) (0.318) (0.512) (0.462) (0.114) (0.198) (0.149) (0.750) (0.633) (0.288) (0.337) 
Domestic Banks -0.001 -0.005 -0.003 0.0035 0.003 -0.0003 -0.001 -0.012*** -0.002 0.003 0.003 0.0006 
(0.736) (0.261) (0.552) (0.325) (0.408) (0.947) (0.699) (0.009) (0.609) (0.237) (0.506) (0.913) 
Islamic Banks  -0.021* -0.001 -0.012 -0.014* -0.005 -0.013 -0.008 0.015 -0.003 -0.010 -0.012 -0.015 
(0.058) (0.880) (0.305) (0.093) (0.603) (0.243) (0.139) (0.216) (0.826) (0.260) (0.321) (0.306) 
Net effect of the Mobile  na na na na na na --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Net effect of the Internet --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.0006 na na na 0.0002 na 
Pseudo R²/R² 0.245 0.155 0.181 0.171 0.156 0.140 0.232 0.136 0.160 0.167 0.155 0.135 
Fisher  23.83*** 21.73*** 
Observations  729 729 729 729 729 729 701 701 701 701 701 701 
***,**,*: significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. IV: Instrumented Variable. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. R² (Pseudo R²) for OLS (Quantile Regressions). Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations 
where Market Power is least. na: not applicable due to the insignificance of marginal effects. 
International Journal of Managerial Finance
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
23 
Table  6: Quantity Effects of Private Credit  Bureaus  with ICT (IVQR) 
Dependent variable: Quantity of Loans 
Mobile Phones Internet 
OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
Constant  3.829*** 2.386*** 3.271*** 3.345*** 4.624*** 4.862*** 3.787*** 2.277*** 2.888*** 3.489*** 4.771*** 5.156*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mobile Phones(IV) 0.002 0.003** -0.001 0.007*** 0.004* 0.005*** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
(0.354) (0.030) (0.745) (0.003) (0.088) (0.000) 
Internet (IV) --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.047*** 0.018** 0.051*** 0.047*** 0.049*** 0.029*** 
(0.000) (0.048) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
PCB (IV) -0.024*** -0.008* -0.027** -0.029*** -0.056*** -0.008 -0.006 -0.0009 -0.0002 -0.017** 0.0006 0.005 
(0.006) (0.096) (0.018) (0.001) (0.000) (0.150) (0.303) (0.856) (0.984) (0.029) (0.879) (0.197) 
PCB(IV)×Mobile Phones(IV) 0.0002*** 0.0001** 0.0003** 0.0002** 0.0006*** 0.00009 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
(0.008) (0.036) (0.011) (0.039) (0.000) (0.140) 
PCB(IV) × Internet(IV) --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.001* 0.0005 0.0002 0.001** 0.0005* 0.000004 
(0.061) (0.253) (0.759) (0.018) (0.078) (0.987) 
GDPpcg -0.004 0.014* -0.013 -0.008 0.001 -0.013* -0.0002 0.008 -0.038* -0.015 0.008 -0.018* 
(0.172) (0.087) (0.431) (0.565) (0.940) (0.061) (0.983) (0.349) (0.051) (0.386) (0.468) (0.096) 
Inflation  -0.022*** -0.010** -0.011 -0.029*** -0.022*** -0.001 -0.015** -0.009* -0.017 -0.020* -0.017*** 0.005 
(0.001) (0.010) (0.228) (0.000) (0.003) (0.761) (0.022) (0.095) (0.104) (0.068) (0.005) (0.392) 
Pop. density -0.0009*** -0.0002* -0.002 -0.0009** -0.001*** -0.0007** -0.0008*** -0.0007*** -0.00002 -0.0005 -0.001*** -0.0009** 
(0.002) (0.096) (0.583) (0.039) (0.005) (0.028) (0.009) (0.001) (0.964) (0.370) (0.005) (0.048) 
Deposit/Assets 1.883*** 0.949*** 1.160*** 2.525*** 1.482*** 1.327*** 1.789*** 1.157*** 2.240*** 2.314*** 1.266*** 1.162*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0..000) (0.000) 
Bank Branches -0.050*** -0.010* -0.026** -0.063*** -0.059*** -0.056*** -0.106*** -0.022** -0.098*** -0.111*** -0.115*** -0.082*** 
(0.000) (0.073) (0.049) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.023) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Small Banks  -0.830*** -0.824*** -1.318*** -0.819*** -0.400*** -0.216** -0.920*** -0.689*** -1.388*** -0.759*** -0.656*** -0.508*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.019) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Domestic Banks 0.392*** 0.085 0.407*** 0.517*** 0.465*** 0.404*** 0.415*** 0.035 0.524*** 0.485*** 0.622*** 0.556*** 
(0.000) (0.239) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.698) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Islamic Banks  -0.544*** 0.434*** 0.085 -0.388 -1.172*** -1.294*** -0.350 0.389* -0.060 -0.043 -0.659** -0.940*** 
(0.000) (0.005) (0.796) (0.121) (0.000) (0.000) (0.127) (0.079) (0.900) (0.913) (0.013) (0.000) 
Net effect of the Mobile  -0.0165 -0.0042 -0.0158 -0.0215 -0.0337 na --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Net effect of the Internet --- --- --- --- --- --- na na na -0.0091 na na 
Pseudo R²/R² 0.204 0.085 0.113 0.160 0.124 0.131 0.226 0.083 0.122 0.164 0.132 0.137 
Fisher  34.85*** 30.37*** 
Observations  754 754 754 754 754 754 722 722 722 722 722 722 
***,**,*: significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. IV: Instrumented Variable. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. R² (Pseudo R²) for OLS (Quantile Regressions). Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations 
where Market Power is least. na: not applicable due to the insignificance of marginal effects.
International Journal of Managerial Finance
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
24 
International Journal of Managerial Finance
It is important to note that the presentation of the findings has been limited to net 
effects because with interactive regressions, interpreting individual effects can be misleading. 
This is essentially because the issue of multicollinearity between interactive variables is 
overlooked in the specifications (Brambor et al., 2006). In the presence of multicollinearity, 
variables with a high degree of substitution have opposite signs in the regression output (Beck 
et al., 2003). Therefore, focusing on net effects (i.e. the sum of unconditional and conditional 
effects) for policy implications is essential for a comprehensive assessment of the relevance of 
the policy variable in moderating the effect of the independent variable of interest on the 
outcome variable (Brambor et al., 2006). Moreover, the analysis is not exclusively limited to 
net effects because where, marginal effects are consistent with theoretical expectations, 
thresholds at which the policy variable effectively modulates the independent variable of 
interest to achieve the desired effect on the outcome variable are computed. These findings 
are discussed in Section 4.2 with regards to the role that ICT policy reforms could pay in 
modifying the key functions of credit registries which are relevant for increasing access to 
credit.  
4.2 Further discussion of results and policy implications 
This section reconciles the findings of the present inquiry with existing literature. 
Additionally, it explores the policy implications of our findings in terms of how unexpected 
results can be leveraged for enhanced financial access for both households and firms. From 
the several regression outcomes it is  obvious that the relationship between ICT and public 
credit registries (PCRs) leads to greater access to finance compared with the nexus between 
ICT and private credit bureaus (PCBs). Our results are not directly comparable with the 
previous studies reviewed in the introductory section  which have directly examined the 
effects of information sharing offices (i.e., PCRs and PCBs) on financial access. Our 
assessment of the nexus between information sharing offices and access to credit is not direct 
because the relationship is contingent on the role of ICT. Nonetheless, we take a minimalist 
approach by assuming that ICT also indirectly influenced those characteristics of information 
sharing offices which are essential for promoting financial access.   
From a broad perspective, the findings are not consistent with Singh et al. (2009) who 
reported that African nations which have information sharing offices enjoy comparatively 
higher degrees of financial access. The results are supported by Galindo and Miller (2001) 
who found that nations with better developed credit registries are associated with less 
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financial constraints, relative to countries with less developed information sharing offices. 
This narrative is consistent with the present study because from our sample, public credit 
registries are more developed compared with  private credit bureaus. The suggestion  is 
supported by evidence in Appendix 5 which shows that public credit registries are more 
widespread than private credit bureaus in many African countries.  
Conversely, our findings do not align with Love and Mylenko (2003) who concluded 
that private credit bureaus are associated with more financial access when compared with 
public credit registries. Besides, our results are not supported with Triki and Gajigo (2014) 
who reported that countries with private credit bureaus enjoy higher levels of financial access 
relative to countries with public credit registries or neither institution.  
It is also important to explore how the unexpected findings from private credit bureaus 
can be leveraged to enhance financial access. Accordingly, we have seen from the Quantile 
Regressions findings that private credit bureaus increase (decrease) loan price (quantity). 
Fortunately, corresponding marginal effects are negative (positive). This implies that at 
certain thresholds of ICT, the unconditional positive (negative) effect from private credit 
bureaus on loan prices (quantity) can be changed to negative (positive). Thus, the price effect 
of private credit bureaus with internet penetration in the 75
th
 quartile of Table 5 can become 
negative if internet penetration reaches a threshold of 15 (0.0006/0.00004). This internet 
threshold makes economic sense because it is within the range (minimum to maximum) of 
internet penetration provided by the summary statistics (0.037 to 51.000).  
Table 6 shows that the positive marginal effects from the interaction between mobile 
phones and private credit bureaus can convert the unconditional negative effects of private 
credit bureaus on the quantity of loans into overall positive effects on the quantity of loans. 
Hence, mobile phone penetration thresholds of 80 (0.008/0.0001), 90 (0.027/0.0003), 145 
(0.029/0.0002), 93.33(0.056/0.0006) are needed respectively in the 10
th
 decile, 25
th
, 50
th
 and 
75
th
 quartiles to convert the unconditional negative effects into overall positive effects. These 
thresholds also make economic sense because they are within the range of mobile phone 
penetration disclosed by the summary statistics (0.000 to 147.202).  
In the light of the above, the significant net negative effects may be taken as evidence 
that the penetration of ICT in Africa is a necessary but not a sufficient condition in the 
modulation of the role of information sharing offices in promoting financial access. This may 
be due to the low penetration of ICT or the ineffectiveness of ICT in providing timely and up-
to-date credit information that are required by information sharing offices. The poor 
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infrastructure associated with ICT such as electricity outage and poor connection networks 
may also hamper the effectiveness of ICT in complementing information sharing offices to 
reduce information asymmetry in the banking industry in order to enhance financial access. 
As a policy implication both the quantity and quality of ICT need to be improved. In term of 
loan quantity, in order to increase ICT penetration, governments of our sample of African 
countries should design and implement policies that promote universal access and low 
pricing. On the quality perspective, information sharing offices need to be endowed with 
modern ICT infrastructure as well as information systems that enable the accurate, timely and 
effective collection and distribution of information on borrowers’ characteristics between 
banks.  
5. Conclusion and future research directions
This study has investigated loan price and quantity effects of information sharing 
offices with ICT in a panel of 162 banks consisting of 42 African countries for the period 
2001-2011. The empirical evidence is based on Generalised Method of Moments and 
Instrumental Quantile Regressions. The following trends are uncovered.  
First, the findings broadly show that the use of ICT to complement the functions of 
public credit registries would significantly decrease the price of loans and increase the 
quantity of loans. By contrast,  the net effects from the interaction of ICT with private credit 
bureaus do not lead to a noticeable improvement in financial access. Nevertheless,  the 
corresponding marginal effects show that ICT can complement the role of private credit 
bureaus to raise loan quantity and lower loan prices when certain thresholds of ICT usage are 
attained. These thresholds  were computed and discussed for banks with low, intermediate and 
high levels of finance access.  
Second, the statistically significant negative net effects demonstrate that ICT remains a 
necessary but not a sufficient complementary mechanism with which information sharing 
offices can reduce information asymmetry in the banking industry in order to promote 
financial access. This could also imply that the current policy to raise the ICT penetration rate 
in the regions has been  unsuccessful both in terms of quantity and quality. Therefore, the 
feasibility of the estimated negative net effects should not be judged within the framework of 
publication bias or the file drawer concern in social sciences (Rosenberg, 2005; Franco et al., 
2014).   There authors remarked that  whereas strong and expected results are more likely to 
be accepted and published in scientific journals, weak, null and unexpected findings such as 
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the negative net effects reported in this study are readily  discarded or consigned to the file 
drawer in social sciences. As a main policy implication, ICT needs to be improved for the 
sampled countries of the study both in terms of quantity and quality. With regards to quantity, 
governments of African countries need to design and implement policies that promote 
universal access to and low pricing of ICT. From a quality perspective, credit agencies need to 
be equipped with modern ICT infrastructure as well as information systems that enable the 
accurate, timely and effective collection and sharing of information between them and their 
clients, including banks, individual households and corporations.   
Future studies can improve extant literature by assessing if the established linkages 
could withstand further scrutiny when investigated within comparative economic frameworks, 
notably, in terms of bank: ownership (foreign vs. domestic), size (large vs. small) and 
‘compliance with Sharia finance’ (Islamic vs. non-Islamic).  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Summary of expected signs 
Variables 
Expected sign on loan 
price 
Expected sign on loan 
quantity 
Bank-oriented 
features 
Deposit/Asset ratio + +
Bank Branches  - + 
Market-related 
characteristics 
GDP per capita growth Uncertain + 
Population density  + +
Inflation  + - 
Characteristics of the 
unobserved 
heterogeneity  
Small versus(vs). Big  banks Uncertain Uncertain 
domestic vs. foreign  banks Uncertain Uncertain 
Islamic vs. non-Islamic  banks Uncertain Uncertain 
Appendix 2: Definitions of  Variables 
Variables Signs Definitions of Variables Sources 
Mobile Phones Mobile Mobile phone subscriptions (per 100 people) WDI (World Bank) 
Internet Penetration Internet Internet penetration (per 100 people) WDI (World Bank) 
Loan Quantity Quantity Logarithm of Loans  Quantity BankScope 
Price (charged on 
Loans or Quantity) 
Price (Gross Interest and Dividend income +Total 
Non-Interest Operating Income)/Total Assets 
BankScope 
Public credit registries PCR Public credit registry coverage (% of adults) WDI (World Bank) 
Private credit bureaus PCB Private credit bureaus coverage (% of adults) WDI (World Bank) 
GDP per capita GDP GDP per capita growth (annual %) WDI (World Bank) 
Inflation Infl. Consumer Price Index (annual %) WDI (World Bank) 
Populaton density Pop. People per square kilometers of land area WDI (World Bank) 
Deposits/Assets D/A Deposits  on Total Assets BankScope 
Bank Branches Bbrchs Number of Bank Branches (Commercial bank 
branches per 100 000 adults) 
BankScope 
Small Banks Ssize Ratio of Bank Assets to Total Assets (Assets 
in all Banks for a given period) ≤ 0.50 
Authors’ calculation 
and BankScope 
Large Banks Lsize Ratio of Bank Assets to Total Assets (Assets 
in all Banks for a given period)>0.50 
Authors’ calculation 
and BankScope 
Domestic/Foreign 
banks   
Dom/Foreign Domestic/Foreign banks based on qualitative 
information: creation date, headquarters, 
government/private ownership, % of foreign 
ownership, year of foreign/domestic 
ownership…etc 
Authors’ qualitative 
content analysis. 
Islamic/Non-Islamic Islam/NonIsl. Islamic/Non-Islamic banks based on financial 
statement characteristics (trading in 
derivatives and interest on loan 
payments…etc) 
Authors’ qualitative 
content analysis; Beck 
et al. (2010); Ali 
(2012). 
WDI: World Development Indicators. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. The following are dummy variables: Ssize, Lsize, 
Dom/Foreign and Islam/NonIsl.   
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Appendix 3: Summary Statistics 
Mean S.D Minimum Maximum Observations 
ICT Mobile 34.107 32.409 0.000 147.202 1776 
Internet 7.268 8.738 0.037 51.000 1757 
Dependent 
variables 
Price of Loans 0.338 0.929 0.000 25.931 1045 
Quantity of Loans (ln) 3.747 1.342 -0.045 6.438 1091 
Information Public credit registries 2.056 6.206 0.000 49.800 1240 
sharing Private credit bureaus  7.496 18.232 0.000 64.800 1235 
Market 
variables 
GDP per capita growth 13.912 96.707 -15.306 926.61 1782 
Inflation  10.239 22.695 -9.823 325.00 1749 
Population density  81.098 106.06 2.085 633.52 1782 
Bank level 
variables 
Deposits/Assets 0.664 0.198 0.000 1.154 1052 
Bank Branches 6.112 6.158 0.383 37.209 1129 
Dummy 
variables 
Small Size 0.195 0.396 0.000 1.000 1255 
Large Size 0.804 0.396 0.000 1.000 1255 
Domestic 0.753 0.431 0.000 1.000 1782 
Foreign 0.246 0.431 0.000 1.000 1782 
Islamic 0.037 0.188 0.000 1.000 1782 
Non-Islamic 0.962 0.188 0.000 1.000 1782 
Ln: Logarithm. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. S.D: Standard Deviation. GDP: Gross Domestic Product.  
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Appendix 4: Correlation Matrix (Uniform sample size : 684) 
Market-Level Controls Bank-Level Controls Dummy-Controls ICT Info. Sharing 
GDP Infl. Pop. D/A Bbrchs Price Quantity Ssize Lsize Dom. Foreign Islam NonIsl. Mobile Internet PCR PCB 
1.000 0.136 0.007 -0.008 -0.068 -0.014 -0.026 -0.0002 0.0002 0.034 -0.034 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.261 -0.122 0.019 -0.163 GDP 
1.000 -0.028 0.037 -0.236 0.256 -0.009 0.046 -0.046 0.028 -0.028 -0.050 0.050 -0.315 -0.238 -0.205 -0.178 Inf. 
1.000 0.112 0.410 -0.029 -0.125 -0.098 0.098 -0.045 0.045 -0.088 0.088 0.056 0.335 0.546 -0.233 Pop. 
1.000 -0.041 0.080 0.306 -0.041 0.041 -0.062 0.062 -0.210 0.210 -0.087 -0.036 -0.038 -0.083 D/A 
1.000 -0.266 -0.227 -0.078 0.078 0.135 -0.135 -0.051 0.051 0.610 0.747 0.602 0.139 Bbrchs 
1.000 -0.075 0.094 -0.094 0.016 -0.016 -0.097 0.097 -0.206 -0.219 -0.342 0.094 Price 
1.000 -0.171 0.171 0.052 -0.052 -0.067 0.067 -0.096 -0.118 -0.096 0.007 Quantity 
1.000 -1.000 0.026 -0.026 -0.020 0.020 0.146 0.089 -0.084 0.080 Ssize 
1.000 -0.026 0.026 0.020 -0.020 -0.146 -0.089 0.084 -0.080 Lsize 
1.000 -1.000 0.089 -0.089 0.151 0.039 0.010 0.187 Dom. 
1.000 -0.089 0.089 -0.151 0.039 -0.010 -0.187 Foreign 
1.000 -1.000 -0.045 -0.039 -0.014 -0.071 Islam 
1.000 0.045 -0.032 0.014 0.071 NonIsl. 
1.000 0.634 0.304 0.519 Mobile 
1.000 0.513 -0.010 Internet 
1.000 -0.151 PCR 
1000 PCB 
Info: Information. PCB: Private Credit Bureaus. PCR: Public credit registries. GDP: GDP per capita growth. Infl: Inflation. Pop: Population growth. D/A: Deposit on Total Assets. Bbrchs: Bank branches. Szize: Small 
banks. Lsize: Large banks. Domestic: Domestic banks. Foreign: Foreign banks. Islam: Islamic banks. NonIsl: Non-Islamic banks.  Price: Price of Loans. Quantity: Quantity of Loans. ICT: Information and 
Communication Technology. Mobile: mobile phone penetration. Internet: internet penetration.   
5% critical value (two-tailed) = 0.0750 for n = 684. 
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Appendix 5: Country-specific average values from information sharing offices 
Public Credit Registries Private Credit Bureaus 
1) Algeria 0.216 0 .000 
2) Angola 2.412 0.000 
3) Benin 8.037 0.000 
4) Botswana 0 .000 48.150 
5) Burkina Faso 1.750 0.000 
6) Burundi 0.212 0.000 
7) Cameroon 2.312 0.000 
8) Cape Verde 17.042 0.000 
9) Central African Republic 1.412 0.000 
10) Chad 0.400 0.000 
11) Comoros 0.000 0.000 
12) Congo Democratic Republic 0.000 0.000 
13) Congo Republic 3.400 0.000 
14) Côte d’Ivoire 2.487 0.000 
15) Djibouti 0.200 0.000 
16) Egypt 2.062 5.271 
17) Equatorial Guinea 2.566 0.000 
18) Eritrea 0.000 0.000 
19) Ethiopia 0.087 0.000 
20) Gabon 12.716 0.000 
21) The Gambia 0.000 0.000 
22) Ghana 0.000 1.700 
23) Guinea 0.000 0.000 
24) Guinea-Bissau 1.000 0.000 
25) Kenya 0.000 1.750 
26) Lesotho 0.000 0.000 
27)Liberia 0.280 0.000 
28) Libya na na 
29) Madagascar 0.162 0.000 
30) Malawi 0.000 0.000 
31) Mali 2.812 0.000 
32) Mauritania 0.187 0.000 
33) Mauritius 27.866 0.000 
34) Morocco 1.200 4.812 
35) Mozambique 1.637 0.000 
36) Namibia 0.000 50.362 
37) Niger 0.825 0.000 
38) Nigeria 0.025 0.000 
39) Rwanda 0.425 0.275 
40) Sao Tome & Principe 0.000 0.000 
41) Senegal 3.787 0.000 
42) Seychelles 0.000 0.000 
43) Sierra Leone 0.000 0.000 
44) Somalia na na 
45) South Africa 0.000 57.312 
46) Sudan 0.000 0.000 
47) Swaziland 0.000 40.216 
48) Tanzania 0.000 0.000 
49) Togo 2.550 0.000 
50) Tunisia 15.975 0.000 
51) Uganda 0.000 0.512 
52)Zambia 0.000 0.975 
53) Zimbabwe 0.000 0.000 
na: not applicable because of missing observations. 
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